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In this paper we build on our previous work and the work of Peter Lynds within a 
Bohmian framework to consider the intervallic structure of thermodynamic reversibility as 
well as presenting new considerations for the measurement of uncertainty at cosmic scales.  In 
addition we address the fundamental nature of non-locality as an underlying element of 
cosmological structure. 
 
1  Introduction 
 
 Recently there has been some discussion as to whether foundations of physics 
constitutes a proper subject for a complexity conference.  We might begin this 
discussion by arguing that with respect to foundations, it is very likely that real 
progress in resolving the remaining issues of general relativity, particularly those 
issues addressed in quantum cosmology will revolve about broadening, redefining 
and extending our understanding of the foundations of physics.  One particularly 
pertinent example of this kind of extension is demonstrated in Yaneer Bar Yam‟s 
2006 paper “Is a first order space-time theory possible?”[1]  Here, not only are 
fundamentals extended but the possibility of a different and perhaps ultimately more 
useful framework for understanding gravitation is introduced.  Similarly, as we and 
others, specifically Julian Barbour, Carlo Rovelli and Peter Lynds, have argued 
previously a new framework for the understanding of time is necessary for the 
understanding of dynamical processes and the ways in which we may describe 
observed behavioral regularities, including emergent phenomena. [2][3][4][5][6]. 
Finally, there is the question of whether the universe itself may be the result of an 
“emergent” process of selection [7][8][9] 
  
  
 
 
 
1.1 Time 
 
 Common to several of these new theories is the argument that time is an 
endogenously generated variable, perceived as the consequence of the order of 
events rather than as an independent, continuous physical process.  Following Lynds 
[2], we argue that the notion of time as a “flowing” series of instants is a 
fundamental misconception which should not have been carried over from classical 
physics to either modern quantum mechanics or general relativity (where it 
confounds any consistent concept of time as the endogenous product of system 
action and state and where such an approach may incorrectly lead one to extend a 
geodesic which is actually inextensible. [10]. We recapitulate some of our earlier 
arguments in the paragraphs which follow.   
  Our notions of time, instants and the flow of time most frequently 
enter our thinking and discourse as the result of our ordinary experience.  As Lynds 
explains this is primarily the neurobiological function of our perception of intervals 
of relatively short duration as “present” moments in a continuous or “flowing” 
stream of time [11].  While this may be subjectively satisfying and almost 
universally0020experienced it introduces fundamental errors into the discourse of 
physics.  Unfortunately, when scientific research attempts to refute such commonly 
experienced and widely held notions, like those of temporal instants or instantaneous 
transformation, the exposition is often met with knee-jerk criticism.  The Lynds 
paper in Foundations of Physics Letters [2] was initially rejected by many readers as 
a case of not understanding differential calculus.  On the contrary, the differential 
calculus is an excellent and useful abstraction, working very much in the same way 
that “classes of colors” are described as  a “logical fiction” in the Problems of 
Philosophy.[12]  In short, it‟s not that instantaneous transformations are not useful as 
an approximation of the behavior of physical systems, but at some more fundamental 
level it becomes important to understand that in the limiting case they are mere 
approximations and that, in fact, “time does not flow” nor is there any quantizable or 
otherwise dimensionless, static instant in time. [2][13]: 
 
 Time enters mechanics as a measure of interval, relative to the 
clock completing the measurement. Conversely, although it is 
generally not realized, in all cases a time value indicates an interval 
of time, rather than a precise static instant in time at which the 
relative position of a body in relative motion or a specific physical 
magnitude would theoretically be precisely determined. For 
example, if two separate events are measured to take place at either 
1 hour or 10.00 seconds, these two values indicate the events 
occurred during the time intervals of 1 and 1.99999…hours and 
10.00 and 10.0099999…seconds, respectively. If a time 
measurement is made smaller and more accurate, the value comes 
closer to an accurate measure of an interval in time and the 
corresponding parameter and boundary of a specific physical 
magnitudes potential measurement during that interval, whether it 
be relative position, momentum, energy or other. Regardless of 
how small and accurate the value is made however, it cannot 
indicate a precise static instant in time at which a value would 
theoretically be precisely determined, because there is not a precise 
static instant in time underlying a dynamical physical process. If 
there were, all physical continuity, including motion and variation 
in all physical magnitudes would not be possible, as they would be 
frozen static at that precise instant, remaining that way. 
Subsequently, at no time is the relative position of a body in 
relative motion or a physical magnitude precisely determined, 
  
 
 
whether during a measured time interval, however small, or at a 
precise static instant in time, as at no time is it not constantly 
changing and undetermined. Thus, it is exactly due to there not 
being a precise static instant in time underlying a dynamical 
physical process, and the relative motion of body in relative 
motion or a physical magnitude not being precisely determined at 
any time, that motion and variation in physical magnitudes is 
possible: there is a necessary trade off of all precisely determined 
physical values at a time, for their continuity through time. 
 
 We have discussed this simple, but very counter-intuitive conclusion elsewhere 
and simply follow our earlier discussion to summarize the most salient points of 
that discussion, largely just drawing on Lynds own exposition [6][7][10].  The 
following section explores Lynds view in some detail [2], and one might also 
wish to keep in mind Julian Barbour‟s  maxim that “had duration been properly 
studied in classical physics, its disappearance in the conjectured quantum 
universe would have appeared natural.” [3] 
 
 As a natural consequence of this, if there is not a precise static 
instant in time underlying a dynamical physical process, there is no 
physical progression or flow of time, as without a continuous and 
chronological progression through definite indivisible instants of 
time over an extended interval in time, there can be no progression. 
This may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, but it is exactly what 
is required by nature to enable time (relative interval as indicated 
by a clock), motion and the continuity of a physical process to be 
possible. Intuition also seems to suggest that if there were not a 
physical progression of time, the entire universe would be frozen 
motionless at an instant, again as though stuck on pause on a 
motion screen. But if the universe were frozen static at such a 
static instant, this would be a precise static instant of time: time 
would be a physical quantity. Thus, it is then due to natures very 
exclusion of a time as a fundamental physical quantity, that time as 
it is measured in physics (relative interval), and as such, motion 
and physical continuity are indeed possible.  
  It might also be argued in a more philosophical sense that a 
general definition of static would entitle a certain physical 
magnitude as being unchanging for an extended interval of time. 
But if this is so, how then could time itself be said to be frozen 
static at a precise instant if to do so also demands it must be 
unchanging for an extended interval of time? As a general and 
sensible definition this is no doubt correct, as we live in a world 
where indeed there is interval in time, and so for a certain physical 
magnitude to be static and unchanging it would naturally also have 
to remain so for an extended duration, however short. There is 
something of a paradox here however. If there were a precise static 
instant underlying a dynamical physical process, everything, 
including clocks and watches would also be frozen static and 
discontinuous, and as such, interval in time would not be possible 
either. There could be no interval in time for a certain physical 
magnitude to remain unchanging.  Thus this general definition of 
static breaks down when the notion of static is applied to time 
itself. We are so then forced to search for a revised definition of 
static for this special temporal case. This is done by qualifying the 
use of stasis in this particular circumstance by noting static and 
  
 
 
unchanging, with static and unchanging as not being over interval, 
as there could be no interval and nothing could change in the first 
instance. At the same time however, it should also be enough just 
to be able to recognize and acknowledge the fault and paradox in 
the definition when applied to time. 
 
 This position reflects that of Barbour et al, particularly with respect to their work 
on the dynamics of shape and on York scaling [14] and the Lichnerowicz-York 
equation [15] and [16].  But there is a further, fundamental discourse error in 
general relativity caused by Minkowski‟s confounding of the structure of 
geodesics with the flow of time.  In this case, the Minkowski world-line of a 
particle is represented as existing even when there is no relative motion or 
change, arguing that even when nothing happens, time still passes.  As Lynds, 
Barbour, Smolin and others argue, (1) time must be derived from behavior 
within the light cone and is in this sense endogenous to the light cone and cannot 
be separated from the interaction of particles, forces and fields within the 
universe and (2) in this context it may be that time is not a proper first order 
variable of physical theory, but is rather emergent from these reactions. 
[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][16][17]. As we have previously argued [10], this 
choice of categorical structure has left general relativity in a situation where it is 
largely limited, in at least this aspect, from further development by poor 
discourse and an outmoded conceptual schema of space-time. 
 
2.1 Uncertainty 
 
 Lynds‟ discourse introduces a new and additional uncertainty constraint in the 
measurement of time.  In addition to quantum uncertainty, because actual 
measurement takes place on an interval, there are always issues of precision and 
accuracy with respect to temporal measurement.  This is a natural consequence of the 
position that there is no precisely defined static “instant” of time.  In our previous 
work, we have used the Bell-Lynds Metric to explain what this means in a 
quantitative sense.  Bell‟s original formulation involved applying a stochastic 
perturbation to small intervallic measurements of time.  This operation allows for a 
more precise statement of duration while allowing for the kind of measurement error 
explained by Lynds [2][3].  In “Beeables for quantum theory”, Bell argues with 
respect to dynamics that [19]: 
 
 For the time evolution of the state vector we retain the ordinary 
Schrodinger equation, 
 
  d/dt│t> = iH│t>  where H is the ordinary Hamiltonian 
operator.  (4) 
 
 For the fermion number configuration we prescribe a 
stochastic development. In a small time interval dt  
configuration m jumps to configuration n with transition 
probability  
 
  dtTnm,     (5)                         where  (6) Tnm = Jnm ;  and 
  D 
 
 
and                 Dm = ∑ <mq t> 2         (8) 
  
 
 
   provided Tnm > 0  if  Jnm  0  (9) 
 
From (5) the evolution of a probability distribution Pn over 
configurations n is given by: 
 
d/dtPn = ∑ (TnmPm – Tmn-Pn)    (10) 
  m 
 
Following Bell we do agree that the mathematical consequence of this intervallic 
interpretation of the Schrodinger equation (using the stochastic perturbation over a 
small interval as the error term) is: 
 
d/dt <nq t> 2 =  ∑ 2Re <t nq><nq -iH mp><mp t>  or  
    mp 
 
d/dtDn = ∑ (Jnm = ∑ (TnmDm – Tmn-Dn) 
   m      m 
 
 At this point in our previous paper, we diverged significantly from Bell‟s 
interpretation because Bell then uses this exposition to set up a cosmological 3-space 
and 1-time, Hamiltonian and initial state vector 0>.  Our differences are complex, 
insofar as we extend the logic of the 1-time configuration and timelike geodesics 
taken over an interval to argue that time is not the integral of an infinite number of 
precise static instants, but more importantly that time is, in fact a second order, rather 
than first order variable and that it is an endogenous function of the diffeomorphic 
evolution of state space over the manifold.  Similarly, we offer a somewhat different 
interpretation of the problem of specialness than do other authors. [7][10][20] 
 
3.1 The Schrödinger Wave Equation 
 
 There is another sense, independent of the arguments above, in which the 
Schrödinger wave equation requires additional treatment in the context of non-
locality.  This is also a position which is complementary to our earlier arguments 
about the “quantum system” and the definition of said system in the context of non-
locality experiments (see Appendix II for a more complete discussion)[10].   
 Wave functions live on configuration space. Schrödinger called this 
entanglement. The linearity of the Schrödinger equation prevents the wave function 
from representing reality. If the equation were non-linear (e.g. reduction models) the 
wave function living on configuration space still could not by itself represent reality 
in physical space (Bell, 2004) [19].   
 
3.2 The Measurement Problem 
 
Here we follow Bohm (1951 and 1980), and Dürr andTeufel, (2009) [21][22][223]. 
Given a system that can be described by linear combinations of wave functions 
1
 
and 2 . We also have a piece of apparatus that, when brought into interaction with 
the system, measures whether the system has wave function 
1
 and 2 . Measuring 
means that, next to the 0 pointer position, the apparatus has two pointer positions, 1 
and 2, 'described' by the wave functions 0 , 1 , 2  for which: 
 
0 , 1,2
Schrodinger evolution
i i i i  
 
  
 
 
The wave function has a support in configuration space which corresponds 
classically to a set of coordinates of particles (which would form a pointer). 
 
For superposition: 
2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2, , , 1c c c c c c  
 
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )
Schrodinger evolution
i c c c c  
 
The outcome on the right side does not concur with experience. It shows a 
„macroscopic indeterminacy‟. For the Schrödinger cat experiment 
1
and 
2
 are the 
wave functions of the non-decayed and the decayed atom; 0 and 1  are the wave 
functions for the live cat and 
2
 is the wave function for the dead cat. Schrödinger 
says that this is unacceptable. Why? Isn‟t the apparatus supposed to be the observer? 
What counts as an observer?  Certainly, in this sense, one cannot draw a coherent 
explanation from Bohr‟s arguments as indicated by Bell [10]. 
 
3.2.1  Decoherence 
 
 The evolution of : 
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )
Schrodinger evolution
i c c c c  is an instance 
of decoherence. The apparatus decoheres the superposition 
1 1 2 2( )c c of the 
system wave function. Decoherence means that it is in a practical sense impossible to 
get the two wave packets 1 1 and 1 2 superimposed in 1 1 1 2 2 2c c to 
interfere. Decomposition is this practical impossibility – Bell referred this as „fapp-
impossibility‟ where fapp =  for all practical purposes. 
 
 
3.3  Mechanics 
 
 Particle motion is guided by the wave function. The physical theory is 
formulated with the variables 
3, 1,2,3,...i i Nq , the positions of the N 
particles that make up the system, and the wave function 1( ,.... )Nq q on the 
configuration space of the system.  Quantum randomness – Born‟s statistical law – is 
explained on the basis of Bolzmann‟s principles of statistical mechanics. Born‟s law 
is not an axiom but a theorem; Born‟s statistical law concerning  
2
is that if 
the wave function is  then the particle configuration is 
2
-distributed. Applying 
this to: 
  0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )
Schrodinger evolution
i c c c c above implies 
that the result i comes with probability 
2
ic .  
 
  
  
 
 
3.4  The Double Slit Experiment 
 
Each particle goes either through the upper or through the lower slit. The wave 
function goes through both slits and forms after the slits a wave function with an 
interference pattern: 
 
(A) 
 
Close slit 1 open slit 2 
Particle goes through slit 2 
It arrives at x on the plate with probability 
2
2 ( )x  
Where 
2
is the wave function which passed though slit 2. 
 
(B) 
 
Close slit 2 open slit 1 
Particle goes through slit 1 
It arrives at x on the plate with probability 
2
1( )x  
Where 1 is the wave function which passed though slit 2. 
Both slits 
Both slits are open 
The particle goes through slit 1 or slit 2 
It arrives at x on the plate with probability 
2 2
1 2( ) ( )x x  
 
In general: 
 
2 2 2 2 2*
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x x x x x x x
 
 
Here denotes the real part of a complex quantity. The inequality comes from the 
interference of the wave packets 1 2, which passes through slit 1 and 2. 
Situations „Particle goes through slit 2‟ and „Particle goes through slit 1‟  are 
exclusive alternatives entering „The particle goes through slit 1 or slit 2‟, but the 
probabilities 
2
2 ( )x and 
2
1( )x do not add up – this is because „Close slit 1 open 
slit 2‟, Close slit 1 open slit 1‟ and „Both slits are open‟ are physically distinct. 
 
 
3.4.1  Causality, Determinism and Ontology 
 
 This type of methodology is often said to aim at restoring determinism to the 
quantum world. Determinism has nothing to do with ontology. This type of QM is 
deterministic - but is not an ontological necessity.  
 
3.5 Locality 
 
 Einstein deduced from Maxwell‟s equations that space and time change in a 
different way from Galilean physics when one changes between frames moving with 
respect to each other. The nature of this change is governed by the unchanging 
velocity of light when moving from one frame to another. This led to Minkowski 
  
 
 
showing that a particle needs a position in time and space for its specification 
therefore implying that a particle in relativistic space should have time and space 
coordinates.  
 In this section, we explore the argument that any theory must be nonlocal and 
attempt to present a mathematical proof to that effect. Nonlocality is crudely defined 
as meaning that the theory contains action at a distance in the true meaning of the 
words i.e. faster than light action between separated events. 
 Action at a distance is such that no information can be sent with superluminal 
speed – therefore, there is no inconsistency with special relativity. Nonlocality is 
encoded in the wave function that lives on configuration space and is by its very 
nature a nonlocal agent. All particles are guided simultaneously by the wave function 
and f the wave function is entangled, the nonlocal action does not get small with 
particles. 
 In a two particle system with coordinates 
1 2( ), ( )t tX X  we have: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Therefore the velocity of 1( )tX at time t depends in general on 2( )tX at time t, 
no matter how far apart the positions are. In general here means that the wave 
function is entangled and not a product e.g.: (x,y) = (x) (y) . However, there 
is no immediate reason why the wave function should become a product when x and 
y are far apart (although decoherence is always lurking awaiting an opportunity to 
destroy coherence i.e. produce an effective product structure). 
 
4.1  Bell’s Theorem – Part I 
 
 Is it possible to describe a quantum mechanics that is local?  Einstein, Podoloski 
and Rosen (EPR) thought so. The EPR argument is interesting as it constitutes part 
of Bell‟s proof of the Nonlocality of nature. Bell‟s response is Bell‟s theorem: nature 
is nonlocal. 
 In this first part of the argument on Bell‟s Theorem, the EPR argument applied 
to a simplified EPR Gedanken experiment. This approach is based upon the 
argument that one can prepare a special pair (L, R) of spin ½ particles that fly apart 
in opposite directions and which behave in the following well determined fashion. 
  When both particles pass identically oriented Stern-Gerlach magnets, they 
deflect in exactly opposite direction. If L has a-spin +1/2 then R has a-spin -1/2 
where a is the orientation of the magnets. This is true for all directions a. The 
probability for L up, R down is ½. The two particle wave function is called a singlet 
state and the total spin of this singlet state is zero. Measuring first the a-spin on L, 
we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the a-spin on R. This 
is true even of the measurement events L and R are space-like separated.  
 Suppose that the experiment is arranged in such a way that a light signal cannot 
communicate the L result to the R particle before the R particle passes SGM-R. 
Suppose now that „locality‟ holds meaning that the spin measurement on one side 
has no superluminal influence on the result of the spin measurement on the other 
side. Then we must conclude that the value we predict for the a-spin on R is pre-
  
 
 
existing. It cannot have been created by the result obtained on L as we assume 
locality. If the value pre-exists, then that means that it exists even before the decision 
was taken in which direction a the spin on the left is to be measured. The value 
therefore pre-exists for any direction a. This also holds (by symmetry) for the values 
obtained on L. by locality, therefore we obtain the pre-existing values of spins on 
either side in any direction.  
 We collect the pre-existing values in a family of variables 
( ), 1,1L R( )a aX X
with a indexing arbitrary directions and with 
( )L R( )
a aX X .   The locality check is 
now to ask the question if such pre-existing values actually exist.  
 
4.2  Bell’s Theorem – Part II 
 
 There is no way that the variables can reproduce the quantum mechanical 
correlations. Choose three directions, given by unit vectors a, b, and c and consider 
the corresponding 6 variables: 
 
( ), , , , ,L R( )y zX X y z a b c .    They must satisfy:  
( ) ( ) ( ) (R) ( ) (R), , , ,L L L Ra b c a b cX X X X X X
 
 
We wish to reproduce the relative frequencies of the anticorrelation events: 
 
( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)= , = , =L L La b b c c aX X X X X X  
 
Adding the probabilities and using the rules of probability, we get: 
 
( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)Prob = Prob = Prob =L L La b b c c aX X X X X X
 
 
( ) (L) ( ) (L) ( ) (L)
a b b c c a= Prob X = X Prob X = X Prob X = X
L L L
 
( ) (L) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
a b b c c aProb X = X or X = X or X = X
L L L L L
 
= Prob (sure event) = 1, as , , , , ,
i i L R( )yX y a b c can only take two values. 
This is therefore one version of Bell‟s inequality: 
( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)Prob = Prob = Prob = 1L L La b b c c aX X X X X X
 
 
The logical structure of Bell‟s nonlocality argument follows.  
 
Let P be the hypothesis of the existence of pre-existing values 
,
, ,
L RX a b c for the spin 
components relevant to this EPRB experiment. Then: 
 
First part: quantum mechanics + locality -> P 
 
Second part: quantum mechanics-> not P 
 
Conclusion: quantum mechanics -> nonlocality 
 
  
 
 
( ) (R) ( ) (R) ( ) (R)Prob = Prob = Prob = 1L L La b b c c aX X X X X X
is violated by experimental evidence.[24][25] 
We could therefore write: 
First part: experimental facts + locality -> P 
Second part: experimental facts -> not P 
Conclusion: experimental facts -> nonlocality 
Nature is therefore nonlocal. 
 
 
5.1  Conclusion 
 
 We have discussed several key foundational issues in theoretical physics, with 
an eye towards the architecture of quantum cosmology in the preceding paper.  As 
we have argued previously, Lynds‟ treatment of time as an endogenous variable, 
measured over intervals rather than instants leads inexorably in the direction of the 
Lynds Conjecture and his unique solution to the problem of specialness [6][20].  In 
addition, the Bell-Lynds metric strongly suggests that cosmic uncertainty cannot be 
merely the sum of all local uncertainties.   
 Additionally, while there is a deterministic element to quantum mechanics, this 
element is not one of ontological necessity.  This is in contradistinction to Lynds‟ 
solution to the “problem of specialness”, where one can argue about initial state 
configurations of the early universe from a position of quasi-ontological necessity. 
 With respect to non-locality, we show, generally, that non-locality is a 
fundamental property of the configuration space of the universe, and not, simply a 
special case of strange behavior at very fine scales.  We also address Stephen 
Hawking‟s argument that while he does not take a current position on “hidden 
variables”, he believes that in the future (as well as in the development of future 
cosmological theory) new, non-local, hidden variables will be discovered.   
 In addition to the formal body of the paper, Appendix I provides a detailed 
mathematical exposition of a number of issues regarding the quantum system and the 
“quantum problem” of measurement [10][18] addressing Bell‟s concerns with 
respect to Bohr‟s asserted position on the interpretation of quantum mechanical 
measurements.  
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